In a Toronto Star Greater Toronto section story published in the January 15, 2010 edition of the Star, staff writer Louise Brown reported the findings of a study on the project that built the new St. Clair Avenue streetcar line in Toronto ON Canada. Ms. Brown quoted the study as saying "With no clear boss, constantly changing plans and too many small contractors crowding the job site, Toronto’s controversial St. Clair streetcar line cost more time, money, and local anguish than necessary.”

The project was controversial because many residents and small business owners along St. Clair Avenue objected to the project because of the affect they thought the project might have. The project created a dedicated right of way along St. Clair Avenue, both east and west, for streetcars. The benefit of the project was to be an improvement in traffic flow. Streetcars would no longer be held up in rush hour by cars making left hand turns and vehicular traffic would no longer have to stop for the streetcars as they picked up and dropped off passengers. Unfortunately for shop owners the project reduced the sidewalk area in front of stores, cafes and restaurants. Construction also severely restricted traffic along the street for a total of five years. Business was reduced because of the reduction in traffic and some unfortunate businesses that were not robust enough to withstand the loss were forced to close their doors. It gets worse. The final 300 metres of right of way won’t be completed until next spring.

The description of the project as having no clear boss should resonate with project managers from every industry. The problem could probably be better described as having too many bosses who think that they are the chief sponsor for the project. "Constantly changing plans” does that sound familiar to anyone in my audience of project managers? Like most projects in similar situations this one overran its budget and schedule significantly and we’ve already talked about the degree of anguish and the fate of some of the project stakeholders. Some poll, conducted at some point in the future, will record the results of this project and once again the failures will be laid at the project manager’s doorstep.

Let’s look at the facts before we allow the blame to be assigned to the project manager. First, let’s address the issue of no clear boss. The project had 2 sponsors: the city of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC). These are both political institutions, the city is represented by a Council of elected councilors and the TTC is composed of bureaucrats appointed by the city. The project manager would have a difficult time forcing that cast of characters to identify one business sponsor who would take financial responsibility for the project. Like many of these government sponsored projects, there was no clear financial ownership for this project. The best the project manager could do is to point out the risks that failure to identify one business sponsor would expose the project to.

The news story did not mention how the project was organized so I’m making an assumption here that there was one project manager who had overall responsibility for the project. The news story mentions the budget for the project was initially $65M CDN and the project is projected to cost $106M upon completion. The budget overruns and schedule slippages go hand in hand: the longer the work takes the more it costs. The story doesn’t make mention of how the project manager handled changes to the project, but the fact that the impact of those changes was known (the increase in budget was $41M) indicates some form of change management. I find it interesting that the news story reports that the project was $41M over budget without reference to the changes to that budget. Therein lies the cautionary tale for project managers everywhere: it is not enough to craft and implement an air tight plan to manage change, we have to communicate the new baselines that result from an approved change in such a way that not one stakeholder talks in terms of the old baselines. Only then can we avoid the fate of the poor St. Clair project manager who is saddled with responsibility for the project that was $41M over budget.

There is a positive side to this story as well. The study undertaken is the construction industry version of Lessons Learned, conducted on a grand scale. The story does not provide details of the contents of the report other than noting the failures of the project. The study will be used to avoid similar mistakes for upcoming light rail transit projects at other Toronto locations. Lessons Learned seem to be a priority on projects up to the time the project is complete and then no-one wants to hang around to contribute. The best way I know of to combat the urge to run to the exits, regardless of whether the project is a success or a failure, is to make the final Lessons Learned a part of the project and contribution to the exercise a deliverable for the team members.